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Abstract: Before the Lisbon Treaty, environmental non - governmental organisations could 
rarely or not satisfy the admissibility test to gain access to the European courts. This 
contribution examines whether the rules on locus standi under the Lisbon Treaty will 
facilitate their access to justice. Attention will be given to what is understood by a ‘regulatory 
act’, the EU obligations under the Aarhus Convention and whether the new perspectives 
within the Lisbon Treaty will allow environmental non - governmental organisations to 
challenge TAC Regulations.
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1. Introduction
In order to preserve the rule of law and to carry out its obligations under the Aarhus 
Convention1, the European Union (EU)2 should grant access to justice to environmental non -
governmental organisations (ENGOs) to challenge measures taken by EU institutions. 
However, until today the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)3 has rather a conservative 
approach in granting legal standing. One of the major obstacles which ENGOs have to
overcome is the continued application of the Plaumann formula.  This contribution will 
analyse whether the new provisions in the Lisbon Treaty will create new perspectives which 
will enable ENGOs to bring proceedings before the CJEU. Before using the setting of the 
total allowable catches (TAC) under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) as a case study, a 
general review will be given of the Courts approach towards locus standi for ENGOs. 
Subsequently, a short survey will elucidate what is meant by CFP, TAC and Regional Advisory 
Councils (RACs). Some insight will be given in the problems related to the setting of the TAC, 
as well as possible solutions thereto.  Thereafter an analysis will be made of the procedural 
rights of ENGOs under the CFP.  The final section will look at the compliance by the EU with 
                                                            
1 Convention on Access to information, Public Participation in decision-making and Access to justice in
Environmental matters, ECE/CEP/43 (1998).
2 Since the Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force on 1st December 2009, the term European Community is 
merged into the European Union. 
3 Article 19, Treaty on European Union, OJ 2008, C 115/15.  Since the Treaty of Lisbon the whole court system 
of the European Union is known as the Court of Justice of the European Union, comprising three courts: the 
Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal.
its obligations under the Aarhus Convention, the new article 263 Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) and discuss possible alternatives.   
2. Access to justice
2.1 Treaty provisions on access to justice
According to article 263 (2), (4) and 267 TFEU the MS, the European Parliament (EP), the 
Council, the Commission (the privileged applicants), and under strict conditions, private 
parties (the non- privileged applicants) have access to the CJEU.4  In this contribution the 
emphasis will be placed on article 263 (4) TFEU.
Under the rules before the Lisbon Treaty,5 private applicants had to be ‘directly and 
individually concerned’ by a measure to have standing before the CJEU. EU measures are of 
direct concern if they directly affect the legal situation of the applicant. These include 
measures that are self executing, i.e. where implementation results from the EU measure 
without any intermediate rule, action or discretion by the MS. On the contrary, where a 
measure confers discretion to the addressee, the applicant is not considered to be directly 
affected.6 On the other hand, the interpretation by the CJEU of individual concern has been 
very restrictive, as constituted in the Plaumann formula.7 The challenged measure must 
affect the applicant’s position ‘by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason 
of circumstances which differentiate them from all other persons and distinguishes them 
individually’.8 This interpretation is not easy to be satisfied by ENGOs and leaves them little 
room to challenge environmental measures, as ENGOs protect the public interest and 
environmental matters are in general shared.9 Although the Court of Justice (CJ) has 
confirmed that ENGOs can be directly and individually concerned,10 the Greenpeace case11
illustrated that it is almost impossible for ENGOs to enjoy standing before the CJEU.  Since 
ENGOs strive for environmental protection in general, they do not represent an individual 
interest. This means that the Plaumann formula which demands that a person’s interest be 
particularly affected cannot fulfill a distinguishing function here.12
                                                            
4 Article 263 (2), (4) and 267, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ 2008 C 115/47. 
5 Article 230, Treaty of the European Community, OJ 2002 C 325/33.
6 J. Ebbesson, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in the EU, 2002, p. 76.
7 D.Chalmers & A. Tomkins, European Union public law: text and materials, 2007, pp. 420-422; P. Craig & G. de 
Búrca, EU law: text, cases, and materials, 2008, pp.511-513.
8 Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co v. Commission [1963] ECR 95, para. 107. 
9 M. Lee, Legislation and Policy: The environmental implications of the Lisbon Treaty, ENV L REV 2008 (10), p. 
131, 136.
10 For a detailed description of the different situations in which ENGOs are considered to be directly and 
individually concerned see T. Markus, European Fisheries Law: from promotion to management, 2009, p. 256.
11 Case T-585/93, Greenpeace and Others v. Commission, [1995] ECR II-2205; Case C-321/95, Greenpeace and 
Others v. Commission, [1998] ECR I-1651.
12 Case T-585/93, supra note 11, paras. 54, 59 and 63; Case C-321/95, supra note 11, para. 35; See also CaseT-
264/03, Schmoldt and others v. Commission, [2004] ECR II 1515, paras. 100, 131-145.
This restrictive interpretation has been highly criticised in the established doctrine. If the 
criterion of ‘direct and individual concern’ is fully applied it results in the situation that ‘the 
more people that are affected by an EU measure, the less likely that the threshold of the 
criterion can be met’.13  The Plaumann formula has also been critised by Advocate General 
Jacobs and the General Court (GC) in the cases of UPA v. Council and Jégo-Quéré v. 
Commission.14 In the UPA case, Advocate General Jacobs proposed for relaxing the 
admissibility test and advised that the CJ should adopt a new test on individual concern, 
which should focus on ‘the degree of the effect of the measure on the applicant’.15  The GC 
adopted a similar test in the Jégo-Quéré case. The General Court stated that ‘a natural or 
legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of general 
application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in 
a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing 
obligations on him. The number and position of other persons who are likewise affected by 
the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in that regard’. 16 Albeit the critique, the 
CJ confirmed that any reform on standing would have to come from the MS by modifying the 
Treaty, not from the Court.  
The Treaty of Lisbon has amended access to justice. Article 263(4) TFEU17 maintains the 
Plaumann formula, but provides also that a private applicant may challenge ‘a regulatory act 
which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures’. In other 
words, individual concern is being dropped as a condition for the admissibility of individual 
annulment proceedings against regulatory acts. 
However, the TFEU does not define the term ‘regulatory act’. In this context it is important 
to have a closer look at the nomenclature installed by the TFEU, as described in article 288 et 
seq. TFEU.18 The TFEU makes a distinction between legislative acts, adopted by the Council 
and the EP by ordinary and special legislative procedure, and non - legislative acts, which 
appear to include all other acts.  The natural meaning of the phrase of article 263(4) TFEU 
would be any binding act of general application, whether legislative or non-legislative in 
nature, and regardless of its classification as a regulation, directive or decision. However, it 
seems that the Convention which originally drafted these reforms intended the phrase 
                                                            
13 J.H. Jans & H.H.B. Vedder, European environmental law, 2008, pp. 209-214.
14 Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council [2002] ECR I-6677, Jacobs AG, paras. 60-66; Case T
-177/01, Jégo-Quéré v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2365, para. 51. 
15 Chalmers & Tomkins, supra note 7, pp. 429-430.   
16 Case T -177/01,, supra note 14, para. 51; S. Weatherill, Cases and materials on EU Law, 2005, pp. 265-267.
17 Article 263 (4) TFEU stipulates ’Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first 
and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and 
individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail 
implementing measures’.
18 Article 288 et seq. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 4.
‘regulatory act’ to refer only to non- legislative measures.19 Consequently, EU legislative acts, 
even if self-executing, will remain subject to the individual concern requirement. However, 
the CJEU will have to decide whether to adopt a wide or narrow definition of ‘regulatory 
act’.20
2.2   The Aarhus Convention21(AC) and the Aarhus Regulation22 (AR)?  
The EU signed and approved the AC which lays down conditions under which state parties 
have to provide ENGOs with access to justice. Under article 351 TFEU it became an integral 
part of EU law.23 Afterwards, the EU adopted the AR on the application of the provisions of 
the AC to the EU institutions. In the context of this contribution attention must be paid to 
the following. Articles 6(2) and 2(5) of the AC adjudge ENGOs to participate in the process 
for adopting environmental legislation.24 And article 9 AC require state parties to grant 
ENGOs the right to bring an action before a court when they consider that environmental 
law has been infringed by public authorities.25   
Article 10 AR and 12 AR stipulates internal review and access to justice.  Article 10 AR states 
that ENGOs can demand for ‘internal review to Union institution or body that has adopted an 
administrative act under environmental law […]’.26  Environmental law is broadly defined in 
article 2(f) AR.27 Article 12 AR provides that ENGOs may bring an action before the CJ in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty. Since the Lisbon Treaty it refers to the 
admissibility conditions laid down in article 263 TFEU. It must be noted that internal review 
is a pre-condition for commencing  judicial proceedings. In other words, for ENGOs access to 
the European courts is conditioned upon the exhaustion of the possibility to request for 
                                                            
19 The European Convention, CONV 734/03 (2003),p. 20.
20 Lee, supra note 9, pp. 135-136; A. Ward, The Draft EU Constitution and Private Party Access to judicial 
Review of EU Measures, in: T. Tridimas & P. Nebbia (eds.), European Union law for the twenty-first century: 
rethinking the new legal order, 2004, pp.209-218.
21 Convention on Access to information, Public Participation in decision-making and Access to justice in
Environmental matters, supra note 1.
22 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, OJ 2006 L 264/13.
23 Article 351, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 4. 
24 Articles 6(2) and 2(5), Aarhus Convention, supra note 1. 
25 Articles 9(3) and 9(4), Aarhus Convention, supra note 1. Markus, supra note 10, pp. 260- 261.
26 Article 10, Aarhus Regulation, supra note 22.  
27 ‘environmental law’ means ‘Community legislation which, irrespective of its legal basis, contributes to the 
pursuit of the objectives of Community policy on the environment as set out in the Treaty: preserving, protecting 
and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, the prudent and rational utilisation of 
natural resources, and promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems’. Article 2(f), Aarhus Regulation, supra note 22. 
internal review to the EU institutions.28 The possible effect of article 263(4) TFEU and the AR 
on measures taken in the context of the CFP will be discussed below.  
3. The Common Fisheries Policy as a case study: some preliminary issues
3.1 Introduction
Europe is the third largest fish producer in the world.  However, most of the European fish 
stocks are depleting seriously in the recent decades.29 Many of fish stock are overexploited, 
or outside safe biological limits. Overfishing surges the loss of marine biodiversity.  The ‘UN 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment’ emphasised depleted fish stocks leading to the 
destruction of marine life as one of the most significant examples of accelerating, abrupt and 
potentially irreversible changes to ecosystems.30
The main instrument within the EU for managing fisheries is the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP).31 In the CFP, the basic Regulation of 200232 requires that the CFP should take account 
its implications for the marine environment. The EU limits the fishing opportunities to assure 
that fishermen do fish at sustainable levels and that fish stocks are only exploited within 
their safe biological limits. To reach this goal the EU adopts total allowable catches (TAC).  
On the basis of article 43(3) of the TFEU, it is for the Council, based on a proposal from the 
Commission, to adopt measures regulating the quantitative limitations of fishing 
opportunities.33 The CFP stipulates that fisheries measures must be taken in consultation 
with stakeholders, in particular, with the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs).
3.2 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
After the UN straddling stocks agreement,34 which sets out principles for conservation and 
management of fish stocks including the precautionary approach, the EU started to reflect 
on the sustainable development of fisheries. At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
                                                            
28 Article 12 (1), Aarhus Regulation, supra note 22; D. Obradovic, EC rules on public participation in 
environmental decision-making operating at the European and national levels, E.L.Rev 2007, 32(6), p.829, 834 
et seq.
29 “Fisheries”, available at http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/thematic_factsheets/fisheries_en.pdf, p.1.
30 J. Sarukhán & A. Whyte,, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Biodiversity 
Synthesis, World Resources Institute 2005, p.8 et seq.  . 
31 The communication mentions: ‘The Common Fisheries Policy should promote the sustainable management of 
fish stocks in the EU and internationally, while securing the long-term viability of the EU fishing industry and 
protecting marine ecosystems’. Communication from the Commission, A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: 
A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development, COM (2001) 264, p. 6.
32 Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources 
under the Common Fisheries Policy, OJ 2002 L358/59.
33 Article 43(3), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 4. 
34  UN Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (1995).
Development, the EU committed itself to maintain and restore fish stocks.35  The same year, 
the EU incorporated the precautionary approach as well as the ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management in its basic Regulation for the CFP.36
The CFP sets out the legal framework for the management and conservation of fisheries 
resources in the waters under the jurisdiction of the member states (MS). In this matter the 
MS have transferred their powers to the EU. Thus, MS cannot act unilaterally with regard to 
fisheries management and conservation (with a few exceptions).37 If the legislative duties 
have not been delegated to the Commission, MS and the Commission negotiate together the 
CFP and final legislation is adopted within the Council.38 The CFP has constituted 
participation rights for stakeholders within the CFP legislative process, including in the 
process of the setting of the TACs. Both aspects will be described below.  
3.3 Total Allowable Catches (TAC)
One of the instruments used to conserve and manage fish stocks is the TAC. These annual 
catch limits regulate how much of each species a national fleet is legally allowed to catch 
and can be landed from a specific area.39 The legal for basis the allocation of fishing 
opportunities can be found in article 20 of the CFP.40 The final decision on the TAC is taken 
by the Council, based on a proposal of the Commission. When drawing up its proposal, the 
Commission consults stakeholders, formally in the RAC. Meanwhile the Technical Committee 
for Fisheries (STECF) receives data from different institutions.41 Based on the information 
from the stakeholders’ consultation and the STECF, the Commission formulates its proposal.
Before sending it to the Council, the proposal is send to the European Parliament’s Fisheries, 
Economic and Social and Regions Committees for consultation. The latter gives non - binding 
recommendations on the proposal. The Council bases its decision, on the scientific and 
economic advice, provided by the Commission.42
                                                            
35 UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 ( 2002), Chapter IV Protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic 
and social development, p. 20 et seq., nr. 31(a). 
36 Preamble (3) and (4) and Article 2(1), Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002, supra
note 32.
37  Article 8-10, Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002, supra note 32. 
38 Article 43(3) TFEU, supra note 4; Article 29 Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002, 
supra note 32.
39 T. Daw & T. Gray, Fisheries science and sustainability in international policy: a study of failure in the 
European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy, Marine Policy 2005 (29), p.189, 189.
40 Article 20, Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002, supra note 32.
41 Institutions such as the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, International fisheries 
commissions, Member States and third countries. Markus, supra note 10, pp. 66 et seq.
42 J. Hatchard, Engaging stakeholder preferences through deliberative democracy in North sea fisheries 
governance, in: T.S. Gray (ed.), Participation in fisheries governance, 2005, p. 45 , pp. 47 et seq.; Markus, supra
note 10, pp.68-69.
3.4 Regional Advisory Councils (RAC)
The participation rights of stakeholders in CFP have been established in two different 
committees. Additional to the existing Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture43
the Council has established new fora on the regional basis during the 2002 CFP reforms, the 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs).44 The RACs are advisory bodies, and their opinion is 
requested on proposals made by the Commission. It must be mentioned that these 
participation rights are limited to the pre-decision phase, as the RACs are only ‘consulted’ by 
the Commission.45
Each RAC has a General Assembly and an Executive Committee. Both bodies are composed 
by representatives of all interest groups affected by the CFP. On the one hand the groups 
directly affected by fisheries decisions, the fisheries sector, which are assigned two third of 
the seats. On the other hand, the representatives of other interest groups inter alia ENGOs.46
These groups are only given the remaining one third of the seats.47  It must be noted that it 
is possible for the RAC members to submit majority and minority reports as advice. 
However, there is little doubt that a consensus advice, which has the backing of all the 
stakeholders, will be the most influential.48  
3.5 Does this formula work to protect fish stocks?
It must be noted that the TAC system has failed to conserve the fisheries resources. Since 
the 2002 CFP reform slow progress has been made in stock recovery. As a result, more than 
80% of EU stocks are overfished. One of the reasons for this is that the TACs consistently 
have been set at levels which were too high for the fish stocks to sustain.49 In most cases the 
Commission’s suggested limit is increased by the Council. In other words, the TACs are often 
set on higher levels than recommended by scientists. Generally this can be explained by the 
fact that the proposal is conflicting with the economic interests of the MS. Ministers are 
                                                            
43 Commission Decision (1999/478/EC) on renewing the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture, OJ 
1999 L 187/70.  Amended by Commission Decision (2004/864/EC) on amending Commission Decision 
1999/478/EC of renewing the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture, OJ 2004 L 370/91.
44 Article 31, Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002, supra note 32. Note that in this 
paper the emphasis will be placed on the role of the RACs, not of the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and 
Aquaculture.
45 Article 31 (4), Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002, supra note 32; Article 3(3) 
Council Decision (EC) 585/2004 of 19 July 2004 on establishing Regional Advisory Councils under the Common 
Fisheries Policy, OJ 2004 L 256/17; T. Gray & J. Hatchard, The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy’s 
system of governance – rhetoric or reality?, Marine Policy 2003 (27), p.545, 547.
46 The other members of this group are representatives from the aquaculture sector, producers’ organisations, 
consumers’ organisations and recreational fishermen.   
47 Council Decision (EC) 585/2004 of 19 July 2004 on establishing Regional Advisory Councils under the 
Common Fisheries Policy, supra note 45. 
48 L. Motos & D. C. Wilson, The knowledge base for fisheries management, 2006, pp.256-258.
49 Commission opens the discussion on fishing possibilities for 2010, IP/09/747 (12 May 2009). 
occupied with their popularity in the light of the next elections. They have no incentive to 
take decisions to tackle the stock decline as they only pay-off in the long term. This short-
term concern of getting re-elected causes ministers to take populist decisions and set the 
TACs at unsustainable levels. Thus, the Council decision is often more based on social and 
economic reasons rather than ecological reasons.50
Regarding the participation rights of the stakeholders in the RAC, different points of critique 
can be formulated. First, given the multiplicity of stakeholders involved and their conflicting 
interests, it is not correct that the industry representatives dominate the RACs.51 This proves 
to be mistaken, especially since the current state of the fish stocks mainly results from 
fishing practices and lobbying activities of the fishing industry.  While on the other hand
ENGOs pay much attention to overfishing and other threats to the marine environment.52 In 
general, ENGOs are rather critical of the CFP.    Secondly, the division of the RACs into two 
groups of representatives can be regarded as discordant. In addition, the inclusion of a range
of different interests in the ‘other interest’ group can lead to the dilution of the voice of the 
ENGOs.53 Problems arise also due to the structure of the bodies. Once a RAC is established, 
it is difficult to maintain the ratio of two thirds for the fisheries sector and one third for the 
other interest groups.54 Fourthly, the participation is limited to the pre-decision phase as 
the RAC have not been given any decision-making powers.55 Sometimes the RACs’ 
recommendations have been implemented, while in other cases the Commission has 
decided not to follow them.56   Finally, critique can be given that when TACs are set, 
stakeholders have less than one month to comment on the Commission’s proposal.57
3.6 Towards sustainable stock recovery? 
                                                            
50 A.E. Delaney, H. A. McLay &W. L.T. Densen, Influences of discourse on decision-making in the EU fisheries 
management: the case of North Sea Cod (Gadus morhua), ICES Journal of Marine Science 2007 (64), p. 804, 804 
et seq.; Daw & Gray, supra note 39, pp. 190-191; Markus, supra note 10, p. 18 et seq. 
51 V. Frank, The European Community and marine environmental protection in the international law of the sea: 
implementing global obligations at the regional level, 2008, p. 103. 
52 For example: WWF, Greenpeace, Seas at Risk, Friends of the Earth Europe. They conduct research, review EU 
legislation, issue reports and opinions to the EU.
53 Motos & Wilson, supra note 48, p.258.
54 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Review of the functioning 
of the Regional Advisory Councils, COM (2008) 364, p. 6.
55 The Commission argued that giving decision- making powers to the RAC would not be compatible with the 
legal foundations of the CFP, under the terms of the Treaty of the EU. So, the Commission could not allow any 
formal increase in stakeholder involvement. To some authors this seems an extraordinary reading of the 
Treaty. Gray & Hatchard, supra note 45, p.547; Motos & Wilson, supra note 48, p.257.
56 E. Penas, The fishery conservation policy in the European Union after 2002: towards long-term sustainability, 
ICES Journal of Marine Science 2007 (64), p. 588, 592. 
57 Markus, supra note 10, p. 61.
It has been proven that several multi-annual strategies58 have been implemented 
successfully, generating signs of stock recovery.  In other words, setting a TAC only is not 
sufficient to limit fishing mortality. Moreover, in the case of stocks which are seriously 
overfished, an annual limitation in the TAC variation is producing results which go against 
long term interests. Therefore, there should be a stronger focus on long term plans and 
more flexibility in changing TACs, to enable more effective recovery measures for 
overexploited stocks.59 At present the uptake of TACs is measured only by landed catch,
paying little attention to discarded fish.  Future TACs should set limits on the total amount of 
stock that can be removed, irrespective of the catch is landed or discarded.60 Lastly, to avoid 
that TAC decisions are based on mostly economic reasons, it would be likely that the final 
decision would not only be in the hands of the Council. However, the current formulation of 
article 43 TFEU does not point in that direction.61
To improve the stakeholders’ participation of the RACs, provisions should be made for 
compulsory consultation and the advice and opinions should have a binding legal effect. In 
that way stakeholders would really participate in decision making. However, the willingness 
of the EU to change the CFP governance towards a bottom - up system of decision making 
seems far away.62  ENGOs should also be able to act as a counterweight to the views of the 
group of the fisheries sector. To create a better balance between the various interests, the 
current 2/1 ratio within the RACs should be reviewed.  Inadequate stakeholder 
representation could lead to advice that is only in the interest of one group, the fisheries 
sector. Although, no high hopes for changes in the current ratio has to be expected.63  
In other words, if ENGOs would like to influence the CFP and put more emphasis on the 
environmental aspect, it is important that ENGOs have standing before the CJEU. This would 
enable them to challenge the legality of CFP measures. Their locus standi would be a useful 
tool to ensure that the economic and ecological interests are balanced in a viable way to 
achieve sustainable exploitation of fish stocks.  However, the current case law of the CJEU 
regarding the right of standing of ENGOs in environmental matters reveals a conservative
approach, as will be discussed below.
                                                            
58 Two types of plans can be distinguished: recovery plans (article 5) for stocks outside safe biological limits, 
and management plans (article 6) for stocks inside safe biological limits. Article 5 and Article 6 Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, supra note 32.
59 Penas, supra note 56, pp. 588-589.
60 ‘The Scottish Conservation Credits Scheme, Moving fisheries management towards conservation’, WWF 
Scotland (December 2009), available at http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/scottish_conservation-
_credits_scheme.pdf. 
61 The TFEU still preserves the state’s theoretical sovereignty in the field of fisheries. C. Lequesne, The Politics of 
fisheries in the European Union, 2004, p 42.
62Gray & Hatchard, supra note 45, pp. 546- 548.
63 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Review of the functioning 
of the Regional Advisory Councils, supra note 54, p. 5 et seq.
4. Current case law of the CJEU: WWF - UK Ltd. v. Council64
In the light of what is described above, the privileged applicants will be unlikely candidates 
to challenge CFP measures. Therefore it is important that ENGOs have standing before the 
CJEU. Particularly when there is concern about whether CFP measures comply with the 
conservation requirements as laid down in the EU law.   
As a member of the North Sea RAC, WWF brought an annulment procedure before the GC in 
which it challenged the legality of specific cod TACs adopted by the Council. WWF argued 
that the Council was in breach with its obligations under EU law in adopting TACs which 
were not conform to the provided scientific data and which did not comply with the 
precautionary principle.65 Also WWF contested that the TACs were not in accordance with 
the cod recovery plans.66 In order to have standing the WWF had to fulfill the conditions of 
former article 230 (4) EC and had to demonstrate direct and individual concern. In other 
words, WWF had to fulfill the conditions of the traditional Plaumann formula. As the 
Plaumann formula and in particularly the criteria of individual concern is consistently applied 
to all non - privileged applicants  WWF disputed that no effective legal protection exists as 
this admissibility test hold back their right to challenge such a breach by the Council.67   
WWF argued with a number of arguments why the GC should grant the organisation 
standing before the court.68 The organisation tried to prove to be individually concerned by 
referring to the role it played in the RAC which was involved in the system for the setting of 
the challenged TAC.69 Within its argumentation WWF also emphasised that the EU was 
bound by the AC since it forms an integral part of the EU legal order.70 Based on the AC, the 
EU should have taken into account WWF’s contribution into the decision-making procedure 
that led to the adoption of the TACs. That entitlement would give WWF a particular status 
which makes it individually concerned within the meaning of article 230 EC Treaty.71 WWF 
                                                            
64 Case T-91/07, WWF-UK v. Council [2008] ECR; Case C-355/08, WWF-UK v. Council [2009] ECR.  It must be 
noted that these most current cases regarding the procedural rights of ENGO under the CFP dates from before 
the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty and thus from before the new article 263 TFEU. See for a detailed 
analysis, Markus, supra note 10, pp. 263-269.
65 The precautionary principle as laid down in the in article 2 (1), 4 and 5(3) of the Regulation 2371/2002, in 
article 174 of the EC Treaty (current article 191(2) TFEU), and in article 5 and 6 of the Fish Stock Agreement. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, supra note 32; Treaty of the European Community, supra note 5; Fish 
Stock Agreement, supra note 34.
66 Council Regulation (EC) 423/04 establishing measures for the recovery of cod stocks, OJ 2004 L70/8. 
67 J. Wakefield, Sustainability and socio-economic need in the common fisheries policy, E.L.Rev 2010, 35 (4), p. 
476, 484. 
68 For the arguments of WWF, see Case T-91/07, supra note 64, paras. 42 – 60. 
69 Case T-91/07, supra note 64, paras. 42 - 43. 
70 Case T-91/07, supra note 64, para. 53
71 Case T-91/07, supra note 64, paras. 53-55. 
argued that if it was not allowed to challenge the TACs, no other applicant would bring an 
action before court. The later would be in conflict with the rule of law.72  
According to its traditional case law the GC rejected the arguments of WWF and dismissed 
the claim. The GC first considered whether the disputed TACs were of individual concern to 
WWF, since that was not the case, it would be otiose to investigate whether the TACs 
directly affected WWF.73 With regard to the AC the GC held that no particular status was 
conferred on WWF, so the entitlements under the AC and AR did not differentiated WWF’s
position distinguishable from other persons in the meaning of the Plaumann formula.74 By 
simply applying the Plaumann formula, the CJ reaffirmed the Order of the GC and concluded 
that WWF, as a RAC member, was not individually concerned. It must be noted that these 
rulings were subject to critique.75  
5.   Any chances for a positive development?
5.1 Article 263 (4) TFEU
(i) Individual concern 
The question which emerges is what the possible impact could be of article 263(4) TFEU on 
an action for annulment of a Council Regulation fixing the fishing opportunities and setting 
the TAC. This act, taken by the Council, cannot be considered as a legislative act as it does 
not fulfill the conditions of article 289(2) TFEU. Under the Constitutional Treaty a number of 
new legal instruments were proposed, including a ‘European regulation’, which was defined 
as a non-legislative act. And regulations as know under the EC Treaty were renamed 
‘European Laws’.76  Thus, under the Constitutional Treaty such an act of the Council would 
have been a ‘European regulation’. Based on what is discussed above the wording 
‘regulatory act’ probably does not concern legislative acts. Therefore, it seems that an 
autonomous act cannot be considered a legislative act. Thus, to the extent that such an 
autonomous act is of general application, it can be considered as a regulatory act. Following 
                                                            
72 Case T-91/07, supra note 64, paras. 58-59.
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74 Case T-91/07, supra note 64, paras. 80-83.
75 Amicus intervention by WWF-UK in respect of Communication ACCC/C/2008/32, submitted on 1 December 
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this reasoning, a Council Regulation setting the TAC can be considered as a regulatory act. As 
a result, individual concern will no longer be required.77
(ii) Direct concern and not entail implementing measures 
However, in order to fulfill the locus standi requirement, the applicant will need to satisfy 
the direct concern criteria and show that the regulatory act does not entail implementing 
measures. According to settled case-law, for an individual to be directly concerned by a EU 
measure, that measure must directly affect the legal situation of that individual and there is 
no room for any discretion left to the addressees of that measure who are responsible for its 
implementation. That implementation is a purely automatic matter and results from EU
rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules. Only in this case there is 
considered to be no discretion.78 Consequently, the direct concern criteria and the proof 
that the regulatory act does not entail implementing measures will be not an easy hurdle to 
pass in the context of the CFP, as Council Regulation setting the TAC is not implemented 
directly by the EU.79 The MS decide how to allocate their national quota among their 
fishermen.80   In this case it will be difficult for an ENGO to argue that the Council Regulation 
is of direct concern.
It must be noted that there is not a very extensive case law on the direct concern 
requirement which date from before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In many cases 
actions before the courts were dismissed and failed because the courts found it lacked 
individual concern. As a result the courts were of the opinion that it was useless to 
investigate whether the challenged measure directly affected the applicant. Under the 
Lisbon Treaty, the lack of clarity about the meaning of ‘discretion’ and the issue of ‘not 
entailing implementation’ has not been clarified by the new article 263(4) TFEU. On the 
contrary, article 263(4) TFEU places more emphasis on the direct concern requirement which 
will force the courts to elucidate what is understood by ‘discretion’. For example, in the 
context of the allocation of the national quota where there is no discretion left to implement 
the quota but where there is discretion to the MS on how they will allocate their national 
quota among their fishermen. Also the courts will have to shed more light on the meaning of 
implementing measures. In other words, the courts need to adjudicate whether direct 
                                                            
77 R. Barents, Het Verdrag van Lissabon: achtergronden en commentaar, 2008, p. 508.  
78 Case T-127/05, Lootus Teine Osaühing v. Council [2007] ECR II-1, para 39.  
79 Case T-127/05, supra note 78, paras. 42-43-46-47.
80 Voorstel voor een Verordening van de Raad van 16 oktober 2009 tot vaststelling, voor 2010, van de  
vangstmogelijkheden voor sommige visbestanden en groepen visbestanden welke in de wateren van de 
Gemeenschap en, voor vaartuigen van de Gemeenschap, in andere wateren met vangstbeperkingen van 
toepassing zijn, COM(2009) 553. 
access to the courts is prevented by the fact that implementation measures by the MS 
exists.81
Therefore it will remain to be seen whether the courts will apply article 263(4) TFEU
narrowly or whether they will provide effective locus standi to non - privileged applicants. 
However, the latter remains rather doubtful in the case to challenge a Council Regulation 
setting the TAC.
5.2 The Aarhus Convention (AC) and  the Aarhus Regulation (AR)
One can argue that the setting of the TACs falls within the scope of article 9(2)82 and 9(3) AC. 
If a TAC regulation is considered as a decision subject to article 6 (1) (b) AC or as a plan or 
programme subject to article 7 AC, an ENGO should be granted standing.83 As article 9(2)
stipulates that there is no requirement for ENGOs fulfilling the definition of the public 
concerned to show “sufficient interest”.84
Under article 9(3) AC access to justice has to be granted to challenge acts of public 
authorities. However, the AC notion of public authorities excludes institutions ‘acting in a 
legislative capacity’.85 Whether to determine of a Council regulation on TACs fall outside the 
scope of AC and therefore also of the access to justice provisions of article 9(3), attention 
has to be paid to the nature of the Council’s decision when setting the TACs. As discussed 
above, the Council regulation on setting the TACs cannot be considered as a legislative act as 
it does not fulfill the conditions of article 289(2) TFEU.  However, it will be up to the CJEU to 
determine whether the Council is acting in a legislative capacity or not.
With regard to the AR the following has to be remarked. Based on the definition of 
environmental law in the AR, administrative acts connected to CFP measures could be 
subject to internal review.86  However, the scope of the internal review is limited and thus 
also the use with regard to the CFP.  The definitions of ‘Community institution’ (now EU 
institutions) and ‘administrative act’ seem to exclude the internal review of regulations, 
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Aarhus Convention, supra note 1. 
83 Update on the WWF-UK case addressed by ClientEarth to the Compliance Committee in relation to 
Communication ACCC/C/2008/32, p. 4.
84 Article 2(5), article 9(2)(a) and(b), Aarhus Convention, supra note 1.
85 Article 2(2) Aarhus Convention, supra note 1.
86 Markus, supra note 10, p. 262.
which are the instruments regularly used under the CFP.87 First, Community institutions 
‘acting in judicial or legislative capacity’ are excluded from internal review as stipulated in 
article 2 (c) AR.88 Second, the meaning of an administrative act, as defined under article 2(g) 
AR is limited to measures of individual scope.89 This definition does not leave much room for 
manoeuvre and implies that only decisions can be subjected to internal review.90 Since 
regulations on TACs regulate in general manner the use of the fish stocks and their 
extraction rates, they cannot be considered as a measure of individual scope and thus fall 
outside the scope of the internal review provided in the AR.91 The fact that regulations on 
TACs contain detailed provisions does not alter this reasoning. Accordingly, as Markus
argues, the regulations setting the TAC should be considered as legislative acts in the context 
of the AR.92   As the internal review is a pre-condition for commencing judicial proceedings, 
the AR will have facilitate or improve access to justice with regard Council Regulations 
setting the TAC.
6 Other possible routes for access to justice?
6.1 Article 19 (1) TEU93
This article imposes an obligation on the MS to provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective protection in the fields of EU law. In other words, it is an obligation for the MS to 
establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to 
effective judicial protection. Thus, the MS must make it possible to bring an action before a 
national court with a view to obtain a reference to the CJ, without having to break the law.
Where this requirement had to be realised ‘as far as possible’ it is now, under current article 
19 TEU an obligation.94 This results in an improvement of the indirect access to the CJEU.
However, one can ask whether this article will have an impact on the locus standi of ENGOs 
because the Council Regulation regards the setting of the quotas at the EU level, and not at 
the domestic level.  Thus, it would not be correct that ENGOs must start proceeding at the 
national level regarding an unlawful decision taken by the EU institutions. 
6.2 Article 257 TFEU95  
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Notwithstanding, article 257 TFEU might provide an alternative gateway to provide access to 
justice as it empowers the EP and the Council to ‘establish specialised courts attached to the 
General Court to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or proceeding 
brought in specific areas’.  Based on this provision, EU institutions could take action. As 
suggested by the Institute for European Environmental Policy the EU institutions could  
establish a ‘Judicial Panel for Environmental Disputes’ to provide judicial review for 
measures taken by EU institutions which breach EU environmental law in accordance with 
the requirements of the AC.96
6.3 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)97 and article 47 Charter of 
fundamental rights of the European Union98
Following article 9(4) AC, whatever review procedures chosen by Parties to fulfil their 
obligations under article 9(3) AC, they have to meet certain minimal legal standards of 
effective remedy and fair hearing. This concept of ‘effective remedies’ in article 9(4) AC was 
inspired by article 13 of ECHR.99 The case-law of the ECHR on this issue as it stands is 
considerable and refined, and following article 6 TEU, EU institutions have to respect the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR as they ‘constitute general principles of the 
Union's law’. Thus, the article 13 ECHR case-law shall be of much significance to interpret the 
EUs obligations under article 9(3) AC. Moreover, the principles of ‘effective remedy’ and ‘fair 
hearing’ are also laid down in article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,100 which is 
legally binding on all EU institutions since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty.101
6.4 Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee102
The AC Compliance Committee have already correctly concluded that parties to the AC are 
not entitled ‘to introduce or maintain so strict criteria that they effectively bar all or almost 
all ENGOs from challenging acts or omissions that contravene environmental law’.103   There 
is currently an ENGO complaint before the Committee with regard to the above mentioned 
WWF v. Council case.104 If the AC Compliance Committee should stress that the EU is not 
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complying with the provisions under the AC, it would exert pressure on the EU to act
according to its obligations under the AC.  
7. Conclusion
Since environmental considerations permeate the CFP105 it should be peculiar if ENGOs 
would not have the possibility to protect the environment before CJEU.  The relaxation of 
the rules on standing under article 263(4) TFEU is likely to create some new opportunities.
Nonetheless, this new rule also raises significant questions to answer. Only the CJEU itself 
can clarify the scope of article 263(4) TFEU.  One can only hope that the Courts will not 
interpret article 263(4) TFEU in such a manner that the Council can adopt measures without 
fearing that it will be subjected to legal scrutiny. The above analyses shows that a broad 
interpretation of article 263(4) TFEU will be needed to enable ENGOs to challenge a Council 
decision on fixing the fishing opportunities and setting the TAC.   In anticipation of the 
court’s interpretation it can be concluded that the new article 263(4) TFEU offers the 
possibility to be a watershed for access to justice for environmental NGOs. However, it will 
entirely depend on the court’s interpretation whether the existing gaps in the protection of 
ENGOs right to effective access to justice will be closed.  How this will evolve is still to be 
seen. 
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